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This paper investigates whether mandatory activation programs for welfare recipients have 
effects on welfare participation, employment and disposable income. In contrast to earlier 
studies, we are able to capture both entry and exit effects. The empirical analysis makes use 
of a Swedish welfare reform in which the city districts in Stockholm gradually implemented 
mandatory activation programs for individuals on welfare. Overall, we find that mandatory 
activation of welfare recipients reduces overall welfare participation and increases 
employment. We also find that mandatory activation programs appear to work best for young 
people and for people born in non-Western countries. 
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1 Introduction 
Mandatory activation of welfare recipients is a commonly used practice both in the U.S. 
and in Europe. For example, in the years preceding the major U.S. welfare reform in 
1996, a number of states, through state waivers, implemented different types of 
mandatory welfare-to-work programs (see, e.g., Hamilton, 2002). Work requirements 
were also one of the major components imposed by the PRWORA legislation in 1996.
1 
The idea behind mandatory activation is that conditioning welfare on requirements to 
work or to engage in work-related activities, such as education, training or job search, 
will work as a screening device separating the truly needy from those who are not, and 
at the same time, the activation itself will increase the productivity of those who are 
unable to get a job.
2 Besley and Coate (1992) formalize the mechanism behind 
activation requirements and show that activation may have both short- and long-run 
effects on welfare caseloads.
3 
From several randomized experiments, we have obtained a rather good picture of the 
effects of mandatory activation on program participants (i.e., on exit effects; see, e.g., 
Hamilton, 2002, who focuses on the 11 projects that were implemented under the 
National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies (NEWWS) Program).
4 What is 
missing, however, are studies that also take possible entry effects into account. This is a 
serious shortcoming for two reasons. First, as is clear from the theoretical model put 
forth by Besley and Coate (1992), it is the threat of activation rather than activation per 
                                                 
1 For good overviews of this reform, see Blank (2002), Grogger and Karoly (2005), and Moffitt (2007). 
2 The idea has a long tradition in societal program design dating back to, e.g., the English Poor Laws, according to 
which “no able-bodied person was to receive money or other help from the Poor Law authorities except in a 
workhouse”. 
3 Also, Grogger and Karoly (2005) present an economic model describing how mandatory activation reduces welfare 
use as well as welfare payments. 
4 Among the programs that involved mandatory activation, there existed two types of programs, those with an 
employment-focused approach and those with an education-focused approach. In addition, there were also some 
programs that applied mixes of the two approaches. The evidence from this research indicates that the programs 
increased employment and decreased welfare benefits among participants, but had no net effect on the participants’ 
economic well-being. Also, programs that emphasized short-term job search assistance and encouraged participants 
to find jobs quickly already had positive effects on employment after year one, whereas programs that emphasized 
longer-term skill-building activities took some time to have effects. After five years, however, the second type of 
program had caught up with the job-first programs (see Hamilton, 2002). Most successful were the programs that 
combined the two approaches. See also Bloom and Michalopoulus (2001), who present an overview of the results 
from 29 welfare reform initiatives in the U.S. and Canada.   3 
se that matters. Second, among others, Grogger et al. (2003) and Moffitt (2007) argue 
that much of the decline in welfare use and caseloads following the U.S. welfare reform 
in 1996 was due to decreased entry rather than to increased exit.
5 
In this paper, we will use quasi-experimental data from a Swedish welfare reform in 
order to empirically investigate to what extent conditioning welfare on participation in 
work-related activities reduces the number of people on welfare. As opposed to earlier 
studies, we are able to observe both entry and exit effects, although we are not able to 
distinguish between the two. Through the reform, mandatory activation programs were 
implemented gradually in the city districts in Stockholm over the period of 1998 to 
2004. We will use this gradual implementation in a difference-in-differences setup. 
Using data from city districts within a single local labor market has large advantages, 
since it makes it possible to control for macroeconomic shocks, something that is 
difficult when using, e.g., data on U.S. states. Also, the reform was “clean” in the sense 
that the activation programs for welfare recipients were implemented in isolation, hence 
not accompanied by, e.g., financial incentives, like the EITC, or time limits. Finally, 
having access to very rich individual-level register data (on all individuals living in 
Stockholm over the period 1993–2003), we can also investigate whether the effects are 
heterogeneous with respect to, e.g., age and country of birth, as well as investigating the 
effects on a number of important outcomes, such as employment and disposable 
income. 
Overall, we find that the activation programs decrease welfare participation and 
increase employment. However, the effects are different across groups; in particular, 
mandatory activation has especially strong positive effects for immigrants and young 
people. We do not, however, find any significant effects on disposable income. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section describes the 
Swedish welfare system and the activation programs in Stockholm. In section 3, the 
data used are described, and in section 4, we present the empirical strategy that is 
employed. The main results are presented in section 5, whereas section 6 investigates 
                                                 
5 It can also be mentioned that in a related literature on unemployment insurance (UI), there exist two studies that 
both find that workfare, or the threat of workfare, decreases the length of time that participants remain on UI; see 
Benus and Johnson (1997) and Black et al. (2003). 4   
the dynamics of the effects. Section 7 examines whether there are heterogeneous effects, 
and section 8 summarizes the paper and concludes. 
2  Welfare in Sweden 
The Swedish social security system is often considered one of the most extensive and 
generous systems in Western welfare states. The responsibility for supplying welfare 
benefits (the Swedish term is “social assistance”) rests with the local governments, even 
though The Social Services Act constitutes the framework for welfare benefits. It is 
constructed as a frame law, which means that the interpretation and enactment of the 
law is delegated to each municipality. Since 1982, the law ensures that all Swedish and 
foreign citizens living in Sweden have the right to obtain welfare benefits in the absence 
of other means of economic support. As opposed to the situation in many other 
countries (e.g., the U.S. and U.K.), receiving welfare is not dependent on having 
children. However, in order to be eligible for welfare benefits, all other means, 
including savings and valuable assets, must be exhausted. The benefit level should 
ensure a reasonable standard of living, but it is up to the municipalities to decide the 
exact level. However, until 1998, there existed recommendations from the National 
Board of Health and Welfare, and since 1998 these recommendations have been 
replaced by a minimum level.  
In 2006, 392,500 individuals (or about 4.3 percent of the population) received 
welfare benefits (some of the recipients were newly arrived immigrants). About 30 
percent of these received welfare more than 10 months during a year and are therefore 
defined as long-term recipients. Figure 1 describes the development of the number of 
welfare recipients as well as the costs for welfare benefits from the mid-1980s up to 
2006. As can be seen from the figure, starting at the end of the 1990s, both the number 
of individuals receiving welfare and the costs for welfare benefits have dropped. 
However, the costs per recipient (not shown in the figure) have increased, indicating 
that the individuals who are still on welfare remain so for a longer time. In 1999, the 
Swedish government declared an ambition to cut costs for welfare benefits in half, but 
this objective has proven hard to accomplish; even though welfare costs have decreased   5 
over time, they have not decreased by 50 percent. Also, since 2003, the decrease seems 
to have ended. 
 
































                Source: Statistics Sweden. 
 
Welfare recipients are not evenly spread across different groups in society. The 
probability of receiving welfare is largest among unemployed youths without eligibility 
for unemployment benefits, single mothers and individuals born outside Western 
countries.  
During the 1980s, the right to welfare was not tied to any specific requirements on 
the recipient of welfare benefits other than having exhausted all other means of 
financing and being available for work. “Being available for work” was in the early 
1980s defined by The National Board for Health and Welfare as searching for jobs and 
not turning down any “suitable offers”. A “suitable offer” was perceived as a job 
matching the skills and qualifications of the individual and in line with collective 
agreements. However, as the recession of the 1990s led to difficulties in financing the 
social welfare system, the right to welfare became subject to stricter means-testing, and 
the requirement of being available for work was extended to also include participation 6   
in internships and labor market projects.
6 At the same time, the generosity of welfare 
benefits was reduced in many municipalities. 
The right to require participation in activation programs by welfare recipients was 
formally introduced by a change in the Social Services Act in 1998.
7 The new law made 
it possible for municipalities and city districts to demand participation in work-related 
activities, such as internships and supervised job searches, in return for welfare benefits.  
In this paper, we will focus on the city districts in the city of Stockholm. The city of 
Stockholm is by far Sweden’s largest municipality, with approximately 780,000 
inhabitants in 2006. It makes up the central part of a much larger labor market area. 
Next, we will turn to a description of the programs in place in Stockholm. 
3 Empirical  setting 
During the period studied (1993–2003), the municipality of Stockholm was divided into 
18 city districts (see Map in Appendix A).
8 The city districts are responsible for the 
majority of the municipality’s services within their geographical areas.
9 However, the 
municipality sets taxes
10 and allocates funds between the city districts. In addition, it, 
through guidelines, defines overall goals. The political composition in the District 
Councils is equivalent to that of the Municipal Council, which is elected every fourth 
year. Hence, there are no elections at the city district level, and the political majority is 
the same all over Stockholm. 
The earliest examples of activation programs in Stockholm are from 1998 and 1999, 
when Rinkeby and Skärholmen introduced programs intended to enroll all unemployed 
                                                 
6 For a discussion of the welfare system during the 1990s, see Johansson (2000, 2001) and Bergmark (2000). 
7 Many of the changes prescribed by the 1998 law reflected trends that had been in practice earlier; Salonen and 
Ulmestig (2001) show that many municipalities seem to have applied rules similar to the new policy even before 
1998. Also, the rule has been used in a wider sense, for example, to apply to groups other than youths. 
8 On January 1, 2007, the number of city districts decreased to 14. 
9 The districts’ responsibilities include refugee reception services, recreational programs for children and youth, pre-
school, income support, budgetary counseling and debt restructuring, consumer advisory services, local business and 
labor market initiatives, local urban environment issues, maintenance of parks, services and care for the disabled, 
social services, care and treatment, family law, and elderly services. 
10 In Sweden, municipalities have the right to collect revenues from a local, proportional, income tax. They are also 
allowed to charge user fees for some of the services they provide.   7 
welfare recipients in job searching activities.
11 They were followed by Kista and Farsta 
in 2001 and by many other city districts since then. In fact, since 2004 there have been 
mandatory activation programs in force in all city districts. 
These programs have been known under the name “activation programs” and 
typically require a number of hours’ attendance each week. According to the official 
descriptions, the aims of the programs are to facilitate job searches for the unemployed 
and to “coach” the participants to become self-supporting. However, in a case study by 
Thorén (2005), it is concluded that “municipal activation policy in its practical form 
will not necessarily improve client’s prospects to find employment since its primary 
function rather is as a method to control clients’ entitlement to social assistance”. The 
organization of the programs makes it possible for the welfare administration to monitor 
the willingness to work. 
In order to determine when the different city districts launched mandatory activation, 
we have disseminated a questionnaire addressed to the heads of the welfare 
administration in each city district.
12 The questionnaire was complemented with 
telephone interviews whenever it was difficult to categorize a program based on the 
information given in the questionnaire. Based on the information from the questionnaire 
and the interviews, we can determine in which year a mandatory program was launched 
in each city district. In order to be labeled as “a mandatory program”, it must be directed 
toward all unemployed individuals receiving social assistance and require attendance for 
some hours per week. The programs all use a common reporting system in which the 
participants’ attendance is recorded daily. Most importantly, the register is open to 
social workers, which means that absence is immediately detected and will in many 
cases lead to reduced benefits. Some of the programs are extensions of previous 
                                                 
11 It is noteworthy that, as opposed to in some other Swedish municipalities, there did not exist any large scale 
activation programs in any of the Stockholm city districts before 1998 when the Social Service Act was changed. 
12 The questionnaire is given in Appendix B. 8   
programs, but the ambitions of the current programs are much higher.
13 Table 1 shows 
when the activation programs subject to this study were implemented.
14 
A valid question is of course whether we can trust the answers given by the welfare 
administrators. Do the programs really include all individuals receiving welfare, and are 
they as harsh as the administrator claims? Without conducting thorough implementation 
studies, we can of course never be 100 percent certain.
15 However, as far as we know, 
there are no reasons for the administration not to tell the truth. Also, it is worth noting 
that if the programs are in fact not as compulsory and “tough” as stated by the heads of 
the welfare administration, we would get estimates that, if anything, are biased towards 
zero. Hence, the effect that we find in the paper should be seen as a lower bound of the 
effects of general activation programs.  
Table 1 Starting years for activation programs in Stockholm city districts 
District Year 
Skärholmen    1999 
Farsta    2001 
Kista    2001 
Älvsjö    2002 
Hägersten    2003 
Liljeholmen    2003 
Spånga-Tensta   2003 
Bromma    2004 
Enskede-Årsta    2004 
Hässelby-Vällingby    2004 
Vantör    2004 
 
                                                 
13 In the earlier years, job seeking activities were often limited to occasional contacts with an employment counselor, 
whose role mostly consisted of discussing the client’s situation and possibly arranging labor market training. 
Cooperation between the social administration and consultants was scarce, and a common view is that the follow-up 
was insufficient. 
14 Since our data end in 2003, the programs started in 2004 are not used in the identification of the program effect. 
Also, in one district (Skarpnäck) it is impossible to establish when the “ambitious” program began, and Skarpnäck is 
therefore excluded. In addition, the most central city districts are excluded from the sample altogether as the share of 
recipients of welfare benefits is very low in this part of the city and their methods are difficult to categorize. Finally, 
Rinkeby is excluded from the analysis since it is an outlier in several respects, not the least in terms of welfare 
participation and share of inhabitants born outside Sweden. We have also estimated the model when excluding other 
city districts, one at the time, and it turns out that Rinkeby seems to be different. It is important to remember that 
excluding Rinkeby implies that we cannot draw inference from our results to city districts like Rinkeby. 
15 We would like to stress that the questionnaire has been complemented with several telephone conversations where 
we have tried to get more detailed information when needed. In addition, in the interviews we ask about programs 
that have actually been in place for a number of years, making it likely that it is the actual program, not just the 
ambitions of the program, that we capture.   9 
In order to provide a better understanding of the programs, we will describe the program 
in Skärholmen in more detail. The program in Skärholmen is one of the most 
documented programs (see Ekström, 2005 and Thorén, 2005 for a more detailed 
description), and it is to a large extent comparable to other, less documented programs 
in other parts of the city.
16 For example, three other city districts (Hägersten, 
Liljeholmen and Älvsjö) have joined the project, and during our study period, the four 
districts shared the facilities in Skärholmen.  
In 1998, the city district of Skärholmen began to apply a method that has since 
become known as "the Skärholmen model". During the first year, the activities were 
only directed to students who were unemployed during the summer, but in 1999, the 
program was extended to include all unemployed recipients of welfare benefits. When 
welfare applicants enter the welfare services office, those whose main motivation for 
applying for welfare is categorized as “unemployment” are immediately sent to “The 
Job Center” (the local employment agency that administers the job-seeking activities for 
welfare recipients). Usually, the applicants must meet with Job center personnel before 
their application is processed. Sometimes the applicant is given suggestions on jobs to 
seek or other activities on their first visit to the Job center. As long as a person has not 
found a job or an activity to participate in, the program requires three hours of daily 
attendance at the Job center, either in the morning or in the afternoon. Every second 
week the schedule rotates in order to prevent black market work. The central component 
in the model is job-seeking activities. These are facilitated by providing job seekers 
with an individual labor market coach and material that may be helpful in the job 
search, such as computers, telephones and stationery. In addition to job-seeking 
activities, the program involves participation in internships, short-term education such 
as computer courses, and other activities arranged by the city district, such as gardening 
or cleaning in the community. As noted by Thorén (2005), many of the activities aim at 
testing the participants’ willingness to work. There is also a large amount of cooperation 
                                                 
16 Blomberg et al. (2006) study the activation programs implemented in six city districts (Vantör, Skärholmen, Kista, 
Hässelby-Vällingby, Rinkeby and Spånga-Tensta) and conclude that the programs are similar in many respects. For 
example, all districts have reception offices from which the welfare applicants are directed to activation centers. At 
these centers, a mix of the following activities takes place: unassisted job search, assisted job search, internships, 
work practice, and job guidance. 
 10   
between the welfare office and the coaches at the Jobcentre. Not participating actively at 
the Jobcentre will be reported to the welfare administrator, who can decline to provide 
the recipients their welfare benefits. 
The data from the questionnaire are combined with individual register data from 
Statistics Sweden. The register data contain yearly information on all individuals aged 
18–64 living in the municipality of Stockholm during the years 1993 through 2003. 
Table 2 reports summary statistics on the variables used in this paper. In order to 
measure the effects on welfare participation, we use a dummy (Welfare recipient) that 
indicates whether the individual lives in a household that received welfare during the 
year.
17 We see from Table 2 that this is true for approximately 9 percent of all 
individuals in our sample. A potential problem with this measure of welfare 
participation is that it is quite crude in the sense that an individual is considered as being 
a welfare participant if he or she has received some welfare benefits at some point 
during a year. However, the amount received differs substantially between individuals, 
and it is therefore also interesting to investigate the effect on the amount of welfare 
money received during a year (Welfare benefits).
18 The average amount received is 
approximately 2,000 SEK per year. This might seem like a low figure, but note that 
individuals receiving no welfare are included. For those individuals who did receive 
some welfare, the average amount received is approximately 22,300 SEK. 
Since we are interested in what happens to individuals who potentially leave welfare 
or refrain from entering into welfare, we will also investigate the effects on 
employment. We use four different measures of employment: A dummy indicating 
whether the individual worked at least 1 hour in November (Employed in November), a 
dummy indicating whether the individual was employed all 12 months (Employed all 
year), a variable that measures how many months the individual was employed in the 
year (Months employed), and income earned from employment (Income from 
employment). In the variables Employed all year and Months Employed, an individual 
                                                                                                                                               
 
17 Welfare benefits are directed to households, not individuals. For simplicity, we will in the rest of the paper write as 
if it was the individual who received welfare. What we mean is, however, whether the individual lived in a household 
that received welfare.  
18 The variable “Welfare benefits” is the individual’s share of the household’s welfare benefits.   11 
was defined as employed if the work performed that month generated an income larger 
than 25 percent of the minimum wage of workers in the hotel and restaurant sector. 
Summary statistics for the different employment measures are reported in Table 2. 
Approximately 74 percent of the population is employed according to the first defi-
nition.  
Finally, we will investigate what happens to the economic well-being of individuals 
by investigating effects on disposable income. As we can see from the table below, 
disposable income varies substantially between individuals.  
In the empirical analysis, we will also control for a number of individual specific 
characteristics; summary statistics for those variables are also provided in Table 2.
19 
Table 2  Summary statistics 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Outcome variables      
The probability of receiving  welfare 0.089  0.285 0 1 
Welfare benefits  2,004 9,571  0  510,800 
Employed in November  0.737  0.440  0  1 
Employed  all  year  0.650  0.477 0 1 
Months employed  8.542  5.136  0  12 
Income from employment  164,234 170,712  0  25,977,500 
Disposable income*  158,138  266,384 -1,551,500  223,910,800 
Control variables      
Woman  0.499  0.500 0 1 
Age  18–25  0.151  0.358 0 1 
Age  26–35  0.262  0.440 0 1 
Age  36–45  0.357  0.479 0 1 
Age  46–64  0.231  0.421 0 1 
With young children (<7 years)  0.184  0.387  0  1 
Born in Sweden  0.776  0.417 0 1 
Born in Nordic country  0.047  0.211  0  1 
Born in Western country  0.025  0.156  0  1 
Born in East European country  0.036  0.186  0  1 
Born in other country  0.120  0.325  0  1 
Elementary school< 9 years  0.204  0.403  0  1 
Elementary school 9 years  0.259  0.438  0  1 
High  school  0.197  0.398 0 1 
College/University<2  years  0.165  0.371 0 1 
College/University>2  years  0.166  0.372 0 1 
Ph  D  0.009  0.095 0 1 
Immigration 2–4 years  ago  0.017  0.131 0 1 
Immigration 5–9 years  ago  0.050  0.217 0 1 
Immigration 10–14 years  ago  0.045  0.207 0 1 
Immigration>15 years ago or not at all  0.888  0.315  0  1 
1 child   0.201  0.401  0  1 
More than 1 child  0.203  0.402  0  1 
* Only available for the years 1995–2003. 
 12   
The city districts are rather heterogeneous with respect to demographic composition and 
outcome variables, as illustrated by Table 3, which presents summary statistics from 
1993 on some of the outcome variables as well as the share of the population that was 
foreign born.  
 
Table 3 City district characteristics in 1993 












Bromma 0.06  1,087  0.76 149,045  0.12 
Enskede-Årsta 0.08  1,525 0.73  129,633  0.16 
Farsta 0.13  2,431  0.70 124,991  0.17 
Hägersten 0.08  1,449 0.73  130,481  0.15 
Hässelby-Vällingby 0.08  1,288 0.74  137,476  0.15 
Kista 0.19  3,847  0.67 120,446  0.42 
Liljeholmen 0.10  1,922 0.71  122,920  0.16 
Skärholmen 0.13  2,092 0.66  119,657  0.32 
Vantör 0.14  2,606  0.68 120,665  0.20 
Spånga-Tensta 0.17  3,209 0.64  124,431  0.42 
Älvsjo 0.07  1,050  0.76  140,942  0.14 
* Only available for the years 1995–2003. 
 
Comparing the figures in Table 3 with the year of program implementation shown in 
Table 1, it is worth noting that the city districts with the highest welfare participation 
seem to have implemented the policy first. In the next section, we will discuss how this 
is taken into account in the empirical analysis. 
4 Econometric  strategy 
When investigating the effect of a specific policy on individual behavior, the 
econometric challenge is to separate effects of the policy from other factors that also 
may affect individual behavior. If one only compares the behavior of an individual 
before and after a policy change, there is a major risk that one also captures differences 
in the behavior that depend on factors other than the policy. One way to isolate the 
effect of the policy from all other things that may affect individual behavior is to 
                                                                                                                                               
19 Exact definitions of all variables as well as data sources are given in Appendix C.   13 
compare the changes in behavior of individuals residing in a city district that has 
implemented the policy with changes in the behavior of individuals residing in a city 
district that has not implemented the policy, thereby netting out other factors that may 
affect individual behavior. We will use this difference-in-differences approach in this 
paper. 
The identifying assumption for this model is that if the policy had not been 
implemented, welfare caseloads in the city district that implemented the policy would 
have changed in the same way as in the city districts that did not implement the policy. 
As mentioned above, the city districts implemented the policy at different times. The 
labor market in these years (1998–2003) was somewhat turbulent, with decreasing 
unemployment rates until 2001 followed by a small increase. Barth et al. (2004, 2006) 
have shown that labor market conditions matter differently for different groups; i.e., the 
weaker the group is with respect to labor market attachment, the more sensitive the 
group is to fluctuations in labor market conditions. Given that the city districts with the 
potentially weakest groups were those that implemented mandatory activation first, one 
might worry that not taking this into account would put the identifying assumption at 
risk. In order to avoid this potential problem, we will control for a number of specific 
individual characteristics and also allow the coefficients for these characteristics to have 
different effects over time. By doing this, we control for the fact that a specific 
demographic structure in the early years may affect welfare caseloads differently than 
having the same demographic structure in the later years, when the labor market 
conditions differ.
 20 
Even after controlling for demographics in the flexible way described above, there 
might be different time trends in the different city districts. We will therefore also allow 
for linear, city-district-specific time trends. The equation that forms the basis for our 
empirical analysis is given by
  
 
                                                 
20 If welfare-prone individuals move between city districts depending on whether or not the districts have 
implemented strict mandatory activation programs, we might be worried that equation (3) captures these effects 
rather than effects on welfare participation. However, Edmark (2007) does not find that the moving patterns of 
welfare-prone individuals differ from the moving patterns of non-welfare-prone individuals. 14   
ijt j ijt t jt t j ijt trend X program Y ε θ β τ α + + + + + = .   (1) 
 
where Yijt is the outcome of interest for individual i in city district j in time period (year) 
t,  αj  are city-district-specific fixed effects, τt are time-specific fixed effects that are 
common for all city districts, programjt is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if 
the policy is implemented in city district j in year t (and all years thereafter), Xijt is a 
vector of demographic covariates, trendj are city-district-specific time trends, and ijt ε  are 
error terms. 
One thing that equation (1) does not control for is unobserved city-district-specific 
shocks that might vary over time. If such shocks exist, they might cause two different 
kinds of problems. First, if the shocks are correlated with the timing of the reform, β 
might capture these shocks rather than true program effects. Second, such shocks might 
imply that the standard errors of individuals within the same city district will be 
correlated, making the estimated standard errors biased and thereby invalidating 
inference.  
Since we focus on city districts within a close geographical distance that also make 
up the center of a much larger labor market region, we believe that we are likely to 
capture any such shocks with the common time effect together with the time-varying 
coefficient on the control variables. However, to examine whether there still exists any 
correlation within the residuals that makes inference problematic, we will conduct the 
test suggested by Wooldridge (2003). He suggests initially restricting the unobserved 
city-district-specific shocks to zero and then solving for β using the minimum distance 
(MD) estimator. The efficient MD estimator is obtained by estimating the following 
model: 
 
ijt ijt t jt ijt X q Y η θ + + =      (2) 
 
and then using the predicted  jt q ˆ from equation (2), estimating equation (3) using 
weighted least squares: 
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jt j jt t j jt trend program q μ β τ α + + + + = ˆ  (3) 
 
where the weights are given by 
2 ˆ / 1
jt σ ,  jt σ ˆ being the estimated standard errors for qjt 
from the estimation of equation (2), and where ηijt and μjt are error terms. Under the null 
of no unobserved city-specific time shocks,  () K S SSR
a
w −
2 ~χ , where S is given by 
T J × and  K is the number of estimated parameters in (3). If  0 H is rejected, then 
Wooldridge proposes to instead use the two-step estimator suggested by Donald and 
Lang (2007). This two-step estimator is conducted by estimating (2) and (3), but in this 
case, the weights for (3) are given by the population shares of the different city districts. 
As a further sensitivity check, we will also conduct a placebo experiment where we 
pretend that the programs took effect five years before their actual implementation and 
then estimate the effects of these placebo programs using data from the pre-reform 
period, i.e., before any city district had implemented any program. Furthermore, we will 
investigate whether any pre-program effects exist, in which case we might suspect that 
the treatment is not exogenous conditioning on controls. If we find an effect of the true 
timing of the reform, but no effect for the placebo reform or pre-program effects, we 
will be more confident that we have in fact captured relevant differences in the city-
districts with our model specification, thus finding the true program effect.  
5  Average effects of mandatory activation 
In this section, we will first estimate the baseline DD-estimates of the effects of 
mandatory activation on welfare, employment and disposable income. Thereafter, we 
will conduct some placebo experiments in order to validate that we have indeed 
estimated treatment effects.  
5.1  Effects on welfare participation 
According to the theoretical prediction from the Besley and Coate (1992) model, 
welfare participation should decrease as a consequence of the introduction of mandatory 
activation programs. Table 4 presents the effect of mandatory activation on the 16   
probability for an individual to receive welfare sometime during a year as well as the 
amount received (including zeros). We use a linear probability model, controlling for 
several observed as well as unobserved characteristics of the city districts. In the first 
two columns, we estimate the model using individual level data, thereby ignoring any 
city-district-specific time shocks. Doing this, we find that the probability that the 
household receives welfare decreases by 0.4 percentage points when mandatory 
activation is implemented. This corresponds to a 4.5 percent decrease at the mean value. 
Also, the amount received decreases by almost 80 SEK per year. This corresponds to a 
decrease of 3.6 percent at the mean value. 
Whether or not it is possible to draw a correct inference from the estimated standard 
errors depends on whether there are any city-district-specific time shocks that we have 
not controlled for. We test this along the lines suggested by Wooldridge (2003). The 
resulting test statistic is given in the third line from the bottom in the table. Since the 
critical value at the 10 percent significance level is 106.5, we must reject the null of no 
city-district-specific shocks. We therefore turn to the Donald and Lang estimates 
presented in columns (3) and (4). They show that mandatory activation decreases 
welfare participation, but that the effect is only statistically significant (at the 10 percent 
level) for the probability of receiving welfare. For the benefit level, the effect is 
statistically significant at the 20 percent level. These results indicate that mandatory 
activation may reduce welfare participation, but no strong conclusion can be drawn due 
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Table 4 Effects on welfare participation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Individual level data  Donald and Lang estimator 








Treatment effect  -0.004*** -79.5** -0.005*  -97.0 








R-squared  0.15  0.10   
No. of obs.  2,535,573  2,535,573  121  121 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. Standard errors in columns (1) and (2) are clustered at the household level. The estimated models 
include city district fixed effects, time effects, individual characteristics (gender, education level, immigration year, 
region of birth, children and age), time varying parameters on covariates and district specific time trends. 
 
5.2 Effects  on  employment 
In this section, we will examine the effects of activation programs on employment.
21 
We use four different variables to capture effects on employment. The first is a dummy 
taking the value one if the individual was employed in November in a given year and 
zero otherwise. The second is the number of months that the individual has been 
employed during a year. The third is a dummy indicating whether an individual has 
been employed all 12 months of the year, and the fourth is income from employment. 
The results are presented in Table 5. Regardless of which employment measure we use, 
we find that mandatory activation increases employment. Starting with the November 
measure, we find that mandatory activation increases the individual’s probability of 
being employed by 0.4 percentage points, which corresponds to an increase of 0.5 
percent. Furthermore, the number of months that the individual is employed increases 
by 0.04 months (1 percent), and the probability that the individual is employed for the 
full year increases by 0.3 percentage points (0.5 percent). Finally, income from 
employment increases by 1,283.4 SEK per year, which corresponds to 0.8 percent of the 
mean value in the sample.  
Based on the Wooldridge test, we cannot reject the null of no city-district-specific 
time shocks. Since all city districts are centered in the middle of the same labor market 
region, this result is as expected. Hence, we do not need to turn to the Donald and Lang 18   
(2007) estimator, instead using individual level data for inference. Doing this, we con-
clude that all estimates are statistically significant.  
 
Table 5 Effects on employment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Individual level data 
  The probability of 
employment in 
November 
The number of 
months employed 
The probability of 
being employed 
for the full year 
Income from 
employment 
Treatment effect  0.004***  0.041*** 0.003**  1,283.4*** 











R-squared  0.13 0.14 0.14 0.23 
No. of obs.  2,535,573  2,535,573 2,535,573 2,535,573 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on households in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 
10 percent levels, respectively. The estimated models include city district fixed effects, time effects, individual 
characteristics (gender, education level, immigration year, region of birth, children and age), time varying parameters 
on covariates and district specific time trends. 
 
5.3  Effects on economic well-being 
Another interesting question is how well the individuals are doing in economic terms. 
Thanks to reliable register-based information on individuals’ disposable income
22, we 
are able to analyze this, something that has not been done in earlier studies on U.S. 
welfare reform when relying on observational data.
23 From the results, presented in 
Table 6, it is clear that the introduction of mandatory activation leads to a significant net 
increase in disposable income of 1,947 SEK. However, the Wooldridge test rejects the 
null of no city-district-specific shocks
24, and the standard errors for the Donald and 
Lang estimator are large. Therefore, we must conclude that we cannot find any 
statistically significant effects of mandatory activation on disposable income. 
                                                                                                                                               
21 The predictions from the Besley and Coate (1992) model are not explicit about outcomes other than welfare 
participation, but implicitly there is an understanding that mandatory activation should have a positive effect on the 
employment rate and, possibly, other labor market outcomes. 
22 Disposable income is defined as all income received (from work, social security systems, transfers, etc.) minus 
taxes and other payments (such as study loan payments).  
23 The income data available in the U.S. are self-reported and, as is discussed in Meyer and Sullivan (2003), income 
therefore tends to be underreported, especially by welfare recipients. Using consumption data instead, Meyer and 
Sullivan (2004) examine the material conditions of single mothers and their families to assess the net effect of the 
U.S. welfare reforms on the well-being of these families. They find that the material conditions of single mothers 
have not declined either in absolute terms or relative to different comparison groups (such as single childless 
women). 
24 The critical value at the ten percent level is 114.1.   19 
Table 6 Effects on disposable income 
 (1)  (2) 
  Individual level data  Donald-Lang estimator 
Treatment effect  1,947***  1,929 






R-squared 0.04   
No. of observations  1,882,630  88 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. Standard errors in columns (1) and (2) are clustered at the household level. The estimated models 
include city district fixed effects, time effects, individual characteristics (gender, education level, immigration year, 
region of birth, children and age), time varying parameters on covariates and district specific time trends. 
 
5.4 Placebo-experiment 
In order to investigate whether the estimated effects in the analysis above are indeed 
program effects, we will next conduct a placebo experiment. If we do not find any effect 
of this placebo reform, we will be more confident that the estimated effect is in fact a 
program effect and not just an unobserved city-district-specific shock. 
In the placebo experiment, we use data from the period 1993–98, i.e., the period 
before any mandatory activation program had been put in place in any city district. In 
order to create placebo reforms, we pretend that the programs were implemented five 
years before they actually were. Hence, we pretend that Skärholmen implemented the 
program in 1994 and that Farsta and Kista followed in 1996, etc. We then estimate the 
same model as in sections 6.3–6.4. Doing this, we obtain the results presented in Table 
7. 
Table 7 Placebo-experiment 
 “True  reform”  “Placebo-reform" 
Prob. of receiving welfare -0.004***  -0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
Welfare benefits, SEK -79.5**  -1.1 
 (34.2)  (32.8) 
The probability of employment in November  0.004***  -0.000 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
The number of months employed  0.041***  0.008 
 (0.015)  (0.016) 
The probability of being employed full year  0.003**  0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.002) 
Income from employment  1,283.4***  77.9 
 (397.1)  (300.6) 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on households in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 
10 percent levels, respectively. The estimated models include city district fixed effects, time effects, individual 
characteristics (gender, education level, immigration year, region of birth, children and age), time varying parameters 
on covariates and district specific time trends. 
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Comparing the “true reform” estimates with the estimates for the placebo reform, we 
can conclude that all estimates for the latter are statistically insignificant. Hence, we 
cannot reject that the effects of the placebo reforms are zero. Furthermore, all of the 
point-estimates are small and close to zero. These findings strengthen our belief that 
mandatory activation affects employment and possibly also welfare participation. 
Another way to investigate if we have captured true program effects or if the results 
depend on some trend that we have not adequately controlled for is to – in addition to 
the treatment indicator in equation (1) – also include dummies for the years preceding 
the implementation of the programs.  
Table 8 shows the results of these estimations, allowing for the reform to have some 
effect already two years before the programs were introduced. For most of the outcome 
variables (four out of six), we do not find any statistically significant estimates for the 
two years preceding the programs. Also, the point estimates are all much lower than the 
point estimate for the program period. For the probability of receiving welfare and for 
the number of months employed, we find some statistically significant effects in the 
period before the program starts. However, the point-estimates are considerably lower 
than for the actual reform year. We take this as further evidence that we have in fact 
captured true program effects. 
















t -0.006**  -116.0*  0.005* 0.0736***  0.004*  1,095.8 
 (0.002)  (53.9)  (0.002)  (0.0248) (0.002) (652.7) 
t-1 -0.004*  -70.6  0.002 0.0353*  0.001  -211.8 
 (0.001)  (43.3)  (0.002)  (0.0197) (0.002) (497.2) 
t-2 0.001  9.4  0.000  0.0278* 0.001  -148.5 
 (0.001)  (33.6)  (0.001)  (0.0155) (0.001) (376.2) 
R-squared 0.153  0.100  0.133 0.140 0.147 0.231 
No. of obs.  2,535,573  2,535,573  2,535,573 2,535,573 2,535,573 2,535,573 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on households in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 
10 percent levels, respectively. The estimated models include city district fixed effects, time effects, individual 
characteristics (gender, education level, immigration year, region of birth, children and age), time varying parameters 
on covariates and district specific time trends.   21 
6  Are the effects sluggish? 
It could be the case that it takes some time before the programs start to have effects on 
welfare and employment if, for example, the programs have some start-up period before 
they are fully implemented, or if it takes time before inhabitants realize that the social 
assistance office demands activation. If so, we would expect the effects of mandatory 
activation to increase over time. In order to investigate this, we have estimated a more 
dynamic version of the model including two additional indicators, one indicator taking 
the value one the year after the reform and afterwards and zero otherwise, and the other 
indicator taking the value one two years after the reform and afterwards. These results 
are given in Table 9. A statistically significant estimate for t+1 or t+2 should be 
interpreted as the effect being larger the year after/two years after the reform. As is clear 
from the table, the full effects are already in effect in the year of implementation. 
 


















t -0.005**  -81.4*  0.004**  0.0457*** 0.00433***  1,370.2** 
 (0.001)  (32.5)  (0.001)  (0.0151) (0.00146)  (395.9) 
t+1 0.001  6.5  0.001  -0.0154 -0.00356**  -317.8 
 (0.001)  (36.6)  (0.002)  (0.0170) (0.00168)  (414.9) 
t+2 -0.001  2.7  0.001  -0.0271 -0.00227  383.7 
 (0.002)  (49.8)  (0.002)  (0.0217) (0.00207)  (511.9) 
R-squared  2535573 2535573 2535573 2535573 2535573 2535573 
No. of obs.  0.153  0.100 0.133 0.140 0.147 0.231 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on households in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 
10 percent levels, respectively. The estimated models include city district fixed effects, time effects, individual 
characteristics (gender, education level, immigration year, region of birth, children and age), time varying parameters 
on covariates and district specific time trends. 
7  Does mandatory activation affect vulnerable 
groups differently?  
So far we have estimated average effects. However, as is shown by Table 10, there are 
certain groups for whom welfare participation is especially high, i.e., younger people, 
those born outside Sweden (in particular, those born in non-Western areas, i.e., Asia, 
Africa and Latin America), and families with children, especially those with a single 22   
parent. It is therefore of interest to investigate whether the mandatory activation 
programs have different effects for these groups. Also, welfare might be extra harmful 
for young people or immigrants due to, e.g., scarring effects, making it especially 
important to understand how to decrease welfare participation in these groups.
25 In this 
section, we will investigate whether the effects of mandatory activation are hetero-
geneous with respect to family status, age and country of origin. We do this by 
extending the baseline model in equation (1) with interaction terms between the variable 
indicating whether a mandatory activation program had been introduced in a given city 
district in a given year (i.e., the program variable) and the socioeconomic variable of 
interest (family status, age, or country of origin). In the tables, we present the 
coefficients for the program variable (i.e., the difference-in-differences estimate) and 
the coefficients for the interaction variables. To save space, we do not report the results 
for the probability of being employed for the full year, and given the results of the 















                                                 
25 Skans (2004) shows that experiencing unemployment subsequent to graduation from high school has negative 
effects on both unemployment and earnings at least five years after graduation, whereas Åslund and Rooth (2007) 
show that exposure to high local unemployment rates affects immigrants for at least ten years after entry to Sweden.   23 
Table 10 Welfare participation among different groups 




November Months All  year 
Income 
from work 
All 0.089  2,004  0.737  8.542 0.650  164,234 
Age        
18–25 0.14  2,494  0.565  6.272 0.377  78,720 
Country of birth        
Born in Nordic 
country 
0.095 2,223 0.711 8.318 0.649  146,126 
Born in Western 
country 
0.062 1,311 0.598 6.956 0.533  125,532 
Born in East 
Europe  
0.157 4,241 0.575 6.615 0.494  109,686 
Born in other 
country 
0.294 7,250 0.512 5.877 0.411  84,201 




0.090 1,413 0.806 9.056 0.702  176,020 
Single parent-
households with 
small children  
0.319 5,953 0.621 6.841 0.493  90,333 
 
7.1 Family  status 
We begin by examining whether mandatory activation has different effects on families 
with children under the age of 7. We have separate indicators for single parents and 
cohabiting parents. From the results, presented in Table 11, it appears that mandatory 
activation typically does not have any significantly different effects on single parents 
with young children. The same goes for cohabiting parents with young children, except 
for the monetary outcomes “welfare benefits” and “income from work”. While 
mandatory activation reduces welfare benefits for two-parent families by almost 700 
SEK, there are no significant effects for single-parent households or households without 
young children. On the other hand, mandatory activation has a negative effect on 
income from work for cohabiting parents with young children, while for the other 
groups it has a significantly positive effect. A possible explanation for the differences in 
the effects on income might be that those no longer receiving welfare benefits in 
families with two adults become dependent on the income of their partner instead of 
turning to paid work. 
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Table 11 Heterogeneous effects with respect to family status 















































R-squared 0.16  0.10 0.13  0.14  0.23 
No. of 
observations 
2,535,573 2,535,573  2,535,573 2,535,573  2,535,573 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on households in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 
10 percent levels, respectively. The estimated models include city district fixed effects, time effects, individual 
characteristics (gender, education level, immigration year, region of birth, children and age), time varying parameters 
on covariates and district specific time trends. 
 
7.2 Age 
Next we examine whether mandatory activation has significantly different effects on 
young people (aged 18–25). The results are presented in Table 12. While there are no 
statistically significant differences between the 18–25 year olds and those over 25 years 
of age when it comes to welfare benefits, there are significant differences between the 
two groups when it comes to the other outcomes (and the differences are huge when it 
comes to income from work). Starting with the effects on employment, it seems like 
mandatory activation has no effects on people aged 26 or older, while it has a positive 
and significant effect for the younger group. The increase in the probability of being 
employed in November for the younger group is 0.9 percentage points, which 
corresponds to a 1.6 percent increase, and the increase in the number of months 
employed is 0.14, which corresponds to a 2.2 percent increase. Turning to the income 
variable, we note that while mandatory activation has a significantly negative effect of   25 
1,813 SEK on income from work for the older age group, it has a significantly positive 
effect of 19,223 SEK (-1,813+21,036) for the younger age group, which corresponds to 
an increase of 25 percent. It thus appears that mandatory activation programs work very 
well for young adults.  
 













DD-estimate -0.006***  -81.3* 0.002  0.0199  -1,812.9** 
 (0.001)  (35.2)  (0.001) (0.0161)  (430.0) 
0.011*** 12.4  0.009*  0.143*** 21,035.9**  DD-estimate 
*Young (18–25)  (0.002)  (69.8)  (0.004) (0.0435)  (1,065.8) 
R-squared 0.15  0.10 0.13  0.14  0.23 
No. of obs.  2,535,573  2,535,573 2,535,573  2,535,573 2,535,573 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on households in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 
10 percent levels, respectively. The estimated models include city district fixed effects, time effects, individual 
characteristics (gender, education level, immigration year, region of birth, children and age), time varying parameters 
on covariates and district specific time trends. 
 
7.3  Country of birth 
Finally, we examine whether mandatory activation has significantly different effects on 
individuals who are born within versus outside Sweden. We have separate indicators for 
whether the individual is born in a Nordic country, in a Western country (apart from the 
Nordic ones), in an Eastern European country or in some other country (i.e., from 
Africa, Asia or Latin America). The DD-estimate in Table 13 then captures the effect on 
native Swedes. It is interesting to note that mandatory activation does not seem to have 
any significant effects on native Swedes. It appears that mandatory activation works 
best for the group with the highest welfare participation; there is a significant and 
negative effect on welfare benefits for those born in Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
The welfare benefits received by this group decrease by 527 SEK, which amounts to 7.3 
percent of the mean value, while income from work increases by 8,142 SEK (9.7 
percent). For those born in a Nordic country, on the other hand, mandatory activation 
seems to be harmful in the sense that it increases welfare benefits, but on the other hand, 
it also increases income from work substantially.  
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Table 13 Heterogeneous effects with respect to country of birth 










DD-estimate -0.002*  -1.8  0.002  0.0203  -966.4 
 0.001)  (38.9)  (0.002) (0.0189) (526.6) 
0.005 442.7*  0.002  0.0116 10,624.9**  DD-
estimate*Nordic (0.004)  (189.5) (0.008)  (0.0913)  (2652.3) 
-0.005 19.1  -0.020  -0.237* -3,367.0  DD-estimate* 
Western country  (0.004)  (171.8) (0.011)  (0.129)  (3,552.6) 
-0.001 -106.6  0.017* 0.145  10,331.1**  DD-estimate* 
East European  (0.005)  (226.5) (0.008)  (0.0965)  (2,534.4) 
-0.014*** -527.2** 0.008 0.115**  8,142.1**  DD-estimate* 
Other country  (0.003)  (128.2)  (0.004) (0.0495)  (1,297.1) 
R-squared 0.15  0.13 0.13  0.14  0.23 
No. of 
observations 
2,535,573 2,535,573  2,535,573 2,535,573  2,535,573 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on households in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 
10 percent levels, respectively. The estimated models include city district fixed effects, time effects, individual 
characteristics (gender, education level, immigration year, region of birth, children and age), time varying parameters 
on covariates and district specific time trends. 
8 Conclusions 
In this paper, we have examined whether the introduction of mandatory activation 
programs has any effects on welfare participation, employment, and disposable income. 
The theoretical prediction from the Besley and Coate (1992) model is that mandatory 
activation decreases welfare participation and, implicitly, increases employment. As far 
as we know, this is the first time that a clear empirical test of the hypothesis that this 
type of program implies fewer people on welfare has been carried out, taking both entry 
and exit effects into account.  
In order to identify causal effects, we made use of a variation that was generated by 
the gradual implementation of mandatory activation in the city districts in the 
municipality of Stockholm. The data are very suitable for examining this question for 
several reasons. First, the reform was clean in the sense that no other instruments, like 
time limits or tax credits, were introduced at the same time, allowing us to estimate the 
direct effects of the programs. Second, the reform was initiated at different points in 
time in different city districts, making identification easier. Finally, by using data from 
city districts within a single local labor market, we were able to control for common 
macroeconomic shocks.   27 
On average, we found a positive effect on employment (the probability that an 
individual is employed increases with the introduction of the programs). Also, our 
results indicate that the introduction of mandatory activation programs decreases 
welfare participation; the introduction of mandatory activation leads to a 0.4 percentage 
point reduction in the probability of being a welfare participant (an effect that 
constitutes approximately 5 percent of the average welfare participation rate in the 
sample). The results support the prediction from the Besley and Coate (1992) model.  
We also found that activation requirements seem to work best for young people and 
for people born in a non-Western country. These results are of particular interest given 
the scarring effects of youth unemployment found in Skans (2004). Hence, it seems like 
the programs work best for the most welfare-prone groups. 28   
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Appendix A: Map – city districts of Stockholm. 




















 32   
Appendix B: Survey to the social service unit of 
the city districts of Stockholm 
(Note that the original version is in Swedish and that this is a translated version.) 
 
The survey refers to information on activities for unemployed individuals, capable of 
working, who receive welfare benefits. 
 
1. Does your city district currently have any activation/labor market related programs 




If no, turn to question 9 of the survey. 
 
If yes, please name the program(s): 
 
2. Since what year has the program or programs existed in their current form (under the 
same or a different name)? 
     
3. Do the program(s) encompass all individuals, capable of working, who are 




4. If you responded "No" to question 3: 
 - What percentage of all individuals, capable of working, who are unemployed and 
receive welfare benefits are served by the program(s)? 
 - Which groups of individuals are targeted by the program(s)? 
       33 
5. Please specify how and to what extent the following activities are being used in the 
program(s): 
    a. Job-seeking activities 
     
    b. Job training activities 
     
    c. Other assigned work (for example, within the municipal services) 
     
    d. Other activities – please specify which: 
     
6. What is the minimum number of hours of weekly attendance that is required in the 
program(s)? 
 





     
8. Can absence/non-attendance (without acceptable motives) lead to rejection of the 





     
In the following part of the survey, we ask for information on programs that were 
targeted to unemployed individuals, capable of working, who receive welfare benefits, 
before the current program/programs started. 
   34   
9. Which programs have been in place during the period from 1990 until the start of the 
current program/programs? Under each heading below, please specify the name of the 
program, or the main activity if you do not know/there was no name for the program 
(for example, "Meeting with job counselor"). Please also specify during what years the 
program/activity was in place. 
     
    Program 1: 
    Name: _____________________________________________________ 
    Time period:____________________ 
     
    Program 2: 
    Name: _____________________________________________________ 
    Time period: ____________________ 
     
    [..etc..] 
     
Below follows a set of questions about the programs/activities that were in place before 
the current program(s). Please answer the questions about each program under the 
heading that corresponds to the list above. 
 
Program/Activity 1: 
     
1. Which groups were targeted by the program/activity? 
     
2. How large a share of all individuals, capable of working and receiving welfare 
benefits, were encompassed by the program/activity? 
     
3. Please specify to what extent the following activities were used in the 
program/activity: 
     
    a. Job-seeking activities   35 
     
    b. Job-training activities 
     
    c. Other assigned work (for example, within the municipal services) 
     
    d. Other activities (please specify which): 
     




If yes, in what way: 
     
8. Could absence/non-attendance (without acceptable motives) lead to refusal/rejection 





     
Program/Activity 2: 
     
    [The same questions were repeated for all programs/activities listed] 36   
Appendix C: Register data 
 
The data used in this paper come from three databases (all of them part of the IFAU 
database): LOUISE, syss and anst. 
•  LOUISE: A longitudinal database containing information on education, income 
and employment for the whole population older than 16 in Sweden. It contains 
data for all years since 1990. 
•  Syss: Syss is part of RAMS (registered labor market statistics) and contains data 
on employers, income from employment and employment from 1985 to 2000. 
For later years, see LOUISE. 
•  Anst: Anst is part of RAMS (registered labor market statistics) and contains 
information about when the employee began work and when the employment 
was terminated.  
 
Table C.1. Definition of variables  
Variable Database  and  name  Description 
Dependent variables 
Welfare recipient  LOUISE: socbidp1*  Indicator variable that takes value 1 if socbidp1>0. 
Welfare benefits  LOUISE: socbidp1  The individual’s share of the household’s welfare 
benefits. Includes zeros. 
Employed in November  sys: syss*  Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if an individual is 
employed for at least 1 hour in November. 
Employed all year  anst: mantill and 
manfran 
The variable takes the value 1 if an individual has been 
employed a full year in a position that has generated 
more than 25 percent of the minimum wage for a worker 
within the hotel and restaurant sector. 
Months employed  anst: mantill and 
manfran 
The number of months an individual has been employed 
during the year in a position that has generated more 
than 25 percent of the minimum wage for a worker within 
the hotel and restaurant sector. 
Income from employment  LOUISE: loneink  The sum of gross earnings from an employer during the 
year. 
Disposable income  LOUISE: dispink  All income from work and social security systems, 
transfers minus taxes, study loan payments, etc. For 
details, see SCB (2005, p. 190). 
Variables used for heterogeneous effects 
Two parent household with 
young children (<7 years) 
LOUISE: barn0003 and 
barn0406, famstf 
Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a household is 
headed by two adults and has children less than 7 years 
in the household. 
Single-parent household 
with young children 
LOUISE: barn0003 and 
barn0406, famstf 
Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a household is 
headed by one adult and has children less than 7 years in 
the household. 
18–25  LOUISE: fodar*  Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if an individual is 
within the age interval 18–25.   37 
Variable Database  and  name  Description 
Born in Sweden  sys: fland  Indicator variable for Sweden as country of birth. 
Born in Nordic country  sys: fland  Indicator variable for any of the Nordic countries as 
country of birth. 
Born in Western country  sys: fland  Indicator variable for any of the Western countries as 
country of birth (Western Europe, U.S. and Canada). 
Born in Eastern Europe  sys: fland  Indicator variable for any of the Eastern European 
countries as country of birth. 
Born in other country  sys: fland  Indicator variable for any other country of birth.  
Other control variables    
Woman 
 
LOUISE: kon  Indicator variable that takes value 1 if an individual is a 
woman. 
Households with young 
children (<7 years) 
LOUISE: barn0003 and 
barn0406 
Indicator variable for the presence of children under 7 
years in the household. 
26–35  LOUISE: fodar*  Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if an individual is 
within the age interval 26–35 
36–45  LOUISE: fodar*  Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if an individual is 
within the age interval 36–45 
46–64  LOUISE: fodar*  Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if an individual is 
within the age interval 45–64 
Children=1 LOUISE:  barn0003, 
barn0406, barn0715, 
barn1617* 
Indicator variable for the presence of one child under 18 
years in the household. 
Children>1 LOUISE:  barn0003, 
barn0406, barn0715, 
barn1617* 
Indicator variable for the presence of more than one child 
under 18 years in the household. 
Elementary school< 9 
years 
LOUISE: hsun*  Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the individual’s 
highest education is elementary school < 9 years. 
Elementary school 9 years  LOUISE: hsun*  Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the individual’s 
highest education is elementary school 9 years 
Notes: * Variable/s used to generate the variable used. 